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Introduction 
Investment, environment, competition. social and other issues were identified at the end of 
the Marrakech Ministerial as possible themes for the WTO. The European Union will very 
shortly have to develop an overall strategy on these themes. The present paper deals with 
one subject, because it is not only a potential WTO theme, but also a subject for decision 
at the OECD Ministerial meeting this May. 
1.  What js at stake 
The surge of global Foreisn Direct Investment (FDI)  1 since the beginning of 1980s has 
transformed  the  old  text-book  model  of trade,  in  which  manufacturers  made  all  their 
goods in  one country and  shipped them  abroad.  In their modern  production  strategies, 
firms ship components from all over the world to their world-wide network of assembly 
plants.  In services, entering a foreign market  more often than not comprises commercial 
presence in the market by setting up a subsidiary abroad. 
Accordingly the Commission's White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment 
points out that  world  economic  relations  are  no  longer limited  to international  trade  in 
goods  and  services.  In  the  world  economy,  the  Community  and  all  major  partners  are 
interdependent: Community policies must reflect and build on this reality.  2 
Foreign Direct Investment has become an essential element in today's complex corporate 
investment  and  production  strategies.  The  development  of  global  instantaneous 
communications  and  data transfer  has  resulted  in  the  creation of a near  global  market 
place.  Modem  economic  operators  are  involved  in  a  continuous  process  identifYing 
shifting comparative advantages which today stem from such factors as knowledge base, 
innovation  capacity  and  the  quality  of human  capital.  The  world-wide  trend  towards 
deregulation and privatisation has given a further boost to this phenomenon. 
The creation of  a truly global system of  markets and production is reflected by  11 per cent 
compound growth in the last 30 years: stocks world-wide have risen from USD 68 billion 
in 1960 to 1650 billion in 1993. Annual flows  in FDI have grown from  USD 60 billion in 
the  mid  1980s  to  USD  140 billion  in  1993.  The  spectacular  raise  in  FDI  has 
complemented and created trade, not substituted it.  Conservative OECD estimates show 
that  at  least  40  per  cent  of world  trade  is  intra  firm  trade,  so  exports  can  be  said 
increasingly to follow investments. 
1  The OECD definition of  FDI compriles investments for the purpo1e of establishins luting economic 
relations  with an  undertakiJII,  IUCb  u, in particular,  investments  which  live the possibility  of 
exercising an effective in1luence of  the management thereof. 
2  European Conunilsion: Growth, Competitiveness. Employment; The Challenaes and Ways forward 
into the 21st Century; White Paper; Parts A and B; Bruaeli/Luxembura, 1994; p.  121. (See also for a 
more detailed analysis of  Europe's polition in the world economy). 
2 The US, the Community and Japan (in that order) renwn the most important sources of 
FDI  with the  non..OECD  countries  playing  a minor  but  increasingly  important  role,  in 
particular the more dynamic ones (NICs, some countries in Latin America). 
However,  dramatic  changes  are  taking  place  as  far  as  the  major  host  countries ·are 
concerned.  The share of inward  investment flows towards the US  and the  Community, 
stable during the 1910s at about «> per cent, has declined markedly to around 30 per cent 
in  1993  1.  On the other hand, the vigorous expansion of investment flows towards non-
OECD countries is the most  notable feature  of recent  FDI development:  in  1993  these 
countries were attracting USD 80 billion worth of  direct investment from abroad or nearly 
SS per cent of  total iaward FDI. We can expect this trend to continue.  4 
Foreign Direct  Investment  today  takes  many  forms.  Besides  the  traditional  green  field 
investments or take-overs, modern operators more and more resort to forms of  businesss 
cooperation,  e.g.  in  joint  ventures,  strategic  alliances  or  pooling  of research  and 
development resources. 
These developments underliile that the general attitude towards FDI has changed.  While 
in the seventies, the debate was larsely dominated by the concern that globally operating 
MNEs would interfere with the independent development of the states, today it  is now 
almost generally accepted that FDI is a beneficial phenomenon - not only for the host-, but 
also  for  the  source country and  will  contribute to  securing our energy  supplies  among 
other things (the European Union is increasingly dependent on imported energy). 
The  OECD  lists  the  injection  of extra  investment  capital  into  the  economy,  the 
contribution  towards  a  healthy  ~ernal balance,  increased  productivity,  additional 
employment,  stimulation of competition and  rationalisation of the production as  well as 
significant transfer of  technical and managerial know-how as positive effects for the host 
economy.  Recognising  this,  the  developing  countries  have  given  up  much  of their 
restrictive attitude apinst the inflow ofFDI. They are often willing to allow free transfers 
without  restrictions  for  balance  of payments  reasons,  have  proven  to  accept  global 
disciplines  on ·trade distorting investment  matters  in  the  Uruguay  Round  and  are  even 
generally  ~ing  to compete for investment from abroad.  Since the dramatic  change in 
East-West  relations  it  has  become  more  evident  that  foreign  investment  is  a  scarce 
resource which no one can afFord penalising; 
Outward  FDI  sometimes  is  still  perceived  as  associated  with  the  loss  of jobs 
("delocalisation"). However, empirical studies have not come to uniform conclusions on 
the  impact  of outward  FDI  on  employment.  The  assumption  of overall  positive 
employment  effects  is  based  on  the  fact  that  all  investment,  including  outward  FDI,. 
generates secondary flows such as exports. of  machinery and other capital goods, demand 
for  manufactured  production  inputs  or  provision  of know-how,  which  are  usually 
provided  by  the  source  country.  This  creates jobs  in  secondary  sectors,  often  higher 
qualified and paid than those that might have been l~st. In addition, investment abroad will 
generate inward tlows of  profits and dividends which, in turn, increase incomes and hence 
demand  in the source COlllltJi.  Again this hu beneficial  effects  on  overall  growth  and 
3  ExcludiD& intra-Community FDI flows. 
4  For more ltatistic:al information sec AnDex I. 
3 employment levels.  To these can be added the longer term development effect of  FDI on 
the  host  economy  which,  in  time,  expands  the  local  market  and  creates  demand  for 
imports, which will, in part at least, be met by producers in the country from which  the 
investment originated.  The discussion on the employment effects of outward FDI should 
also take into account the motivation to invest abroad:  studies show that investments by 
multinational companies are host-market driven,·either to buy into a market or to improve 
servicing the market. In general, access to "cheap labour" does not play an overriding role 
to invest abroad. 
The  increasing  role  of small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs)  in  international 
investment activities is of  partiCular importance for the Community. While the majority of 
foreign investment continues to originate from large multinational companies, the role of 
SMEs  is  growing  and  the  United  Nations  Centre  on  Transnational  Corporations 
(UNCTC) has identified more than 3  700 SMEs world-wide which have invested abroad, 
representing about one tenth of international investments.  UNCTC  concludes in a study 
that these companies offer greater opportunities for training, transfer more technology and 
are more likely to reinvest profits and to use local production inputs, than investments by 
the large ones. 
Europe  should  be  able  to  profit  fully  from  the  world-wide  trend  of liberalising  FDI. 
European firms,  including  SMEs,  have  usually widespread  familiarity  in  investing  away 
from  home  as  a result  of intra-Community experience  where  little  restrictions  on  FDI 
remain. Thus, the European firms are in a good startins position when it comes to making 
use of investment opportunities.  In addition,  the  Community  has  at  its disposal  several 
instruments that  inform about investment opportunities and  support the  activities of its 
firms  abroad (BC-Net, Euro Info Centres,  BRE,  PHARE,  TACIS,  JOPP,  MED-Invest, 
AL-Invest and EC-Investment Partners Programmes). 
To  make  use  of their good  starting  position European  companies  would  greatly  profit 
from a sound world-wide regulatory framework for FDI in which the right to invest and 
fair treatment ofFDI once it has entered the host country are firmly established. However, 
currently no multilateral level playing field for FDI does exist. 
2.  The current rnultilatm;al rules for FD1 
Since  no  single  comprehensive  set  of rules exists,  numerous bilateral  and  a number  of 
regional and multilateral agreements  produce  a fragmented,  non-transparent  picture  for 
FDI. Growing awareness of  the present shortcomings have led to attempts to remedy this 
situation. 
In the framework of  the Uruguay Round the first  small steps have been made to address 
trade  related  investment  issues,  but  the  motivation  was  to  avoid  trade  distortion,  not 
liberalising investment flows.  The GATS sets standards for the commercial presence of a 
service provider in another GATS Member State and therefore covers a substantial part of 
FDI. The results in key service sectors are, however, not yet satisfactory. Here as well, the 
issue is addressed from a trade penpective and important elements of  the promotion and 
protection of  investments are missing. 
The  OECD  Codes  of liberalisation  and  the  non-binding  OECD  National  Treatment 
Instrument relate directly to some investment matters, but the OECD instruments apply to 
the limited number of OECD Members and lack stringent dispute settlement procedures. The  Energy  Charter Treaty  provides binding  national  treatment  in  the  post-investment 
phase,  with  stringent  dispute  settlement  procedures.  For the  present,  only  non-binding 
provisions apply to the pre-investment phase. 
In the recent past regional and sectoral mangements, such as the rules on investment in 
·NAFTA  as  well  as  the  APEC  investment  code  have  been  concluded.  Also  in  the 
framework of the intended Free Trade Area of the  Americas  it  is foreseen  to eliminate 
progressively  burien to  investment.  But  this  is  not  the  appropriate  solution  to  the 
problem created by the lack of  liberalisation and transparency. Regional arrangements can 
easily lead to discrimination for European operators,  as the example of the preferential 
treatment for  establi~g US  and Canadian banks in Mexico under the NAFTA shows, 
and therefore are potentially dangerous for Community interests. 
In  addition,  there  are  more  than  600  bilateral  investment  treaties,  mostly  between 
developed  and  developing countries  .. Since these agreements tend  to be  adapted  to the 
particularities of  the bilateral relations and the national interests involved they are without 
any  uniformity  between  them  and  add  to  the  risks  of discrimination  and  lack  .of 
transparency. 
This  patchwork  of rules  '  is  unsatisfactory  and  is  being  increasingly. seen  as  a  very 
inefficient  and  non-transparent  way  of liberalising  investment  regimes  and  protecting 
investments abroad.  Treatment accorded to European investments in  different  countries 
varies greatly.  A third country may also discriminate between investments from different 
sources  and  even  among  investors  from  different  Member  States.  As  an  example,  a 
company established in a Member State with an affiliate established iil another Member 
State may  face  different  treatment for  their investments  in  a third  country  outside  the 
Community, if  only one of  the Member States has concluded a bilateral investment treaty 
with the third country or if  both Member States have a bilateral treaty with  a different 
level of protection. US and Japanese companies might again be treated differently,  often 
better than the Europeans. 
Nor is the present system able to preserve the liberalisation that has been achieved.  There 
are tendencies, in particular in some OECD countries, to withdraw even from the existing 
level ofliberalisation, as various calls for "conditional" national treatment in US legislation 
shows. 
The present situation is particularly unsatisfactory for SMEs which do not have the means 
to monitor and adapt to the ever-changing conditions for FDI in the host countries. They 
are  not  able  to  defend  themselves  against  government  intervention  or  other  adverse 
measures.  They often will  not take the risk to go to arbitration.  It is  arguable that the 
SMEs have the most to gain from clear and stringent multilateral investment rules. 
Replacing the present system of bilateral investment treaties, regional arrangements and 
the OECD instruments by a transparent, multilateral agreement would assure that the rules 
of  the game are the same for everyone.  As a consequence, in its White Paper on Growth, 
5  An  overview  of  provisions  affecting  investment  in  existing  multilateral  instruments  <WTO 
Apeetnentl,  0ECD  instruments,  NAFI'A,  APEC,  European  Energy  Charter  Treaty,  Lome 
Convention)  is  liven  in  AJmex  II.  Details  on  provisions  relatins  to  investments  in  Europe 
Agreemenb 8lld in Partnenbip 8lld Cooperation AgMements are Jivcn in Annex m. 
5 Competitiveness and Employment 6 the Commission considers the elimination of unequal 
conditions  for  direct  investment  an  essential  part  of its  strategy  for  an  open  world 
economy. 
Therefore, it is the Commission's view that it is of  vital interest to the Community and its 
Member  States  to  actively  pursue  the  establishment  of multilateral  rules  for  FDI. 
Consequently,  it  should develop a coherent approach to formulate the rules Community 
operators need and actively work for the implementation of  these rules in the international 
context. 
3.  What multilateral rules on fDI 
3  .1.  The principal rules of  the pme 
Investment flows,  like trade flows,  wiD  bring most benefits to the world economy when 
they can grow within a transparent and  predictable system of accepted rules.  The efforts 
will have to concentrate on three aspects : 
•  generally free a~  for investors and investments; 
•  national treatment for investors and their investment; 
•  accompanying  measures  to  uphold  and  enforce  commitments  made  to  foreign 
investors. 
a)  Access for investors and investments (riab.t of  entJy and establishment) : 
World-wide there remains  a host of barriers that prevent foreign  investors to enter the 
host countries freely.  Some examples:  governments may only allow a foreign investor to 
set up a subsidiary or take over a local enterprise after a specific authorisation has been 
given.  Foreign  investors  may  only  be  allowed  to  start operations  in  the  form  of joint 
ventures together  with  local  companies.  Joint  ventures  sometimes  cannot  be  majority-
owned  or controlled  by  foreigners.  7  Foreigners  can  be  excluded  from  participating  in 
privatisations  or barred  access  to  government  concessions.  Performance  requirements, 
such as export or local purchase requirements, can be made a condition for establishment. 
Complete sectors of  the economy like transport, energy or financial services can be closed 
for foreign investors. 
These barriers clearly are costly - not only to the investor who is prevented from entering 
freely,  but  also  to  the  host  economy  in  terms  of preventing  additional  employment, 
competition, transfer of  technical and manaserial know-how and a better integration in the 
rapidly  changing  world  economy.  However,  completely  unrestricted  market  access  for 
FDI does not seem likely to be achievable in the real world. Just as under the GATT there 
is no completely free world trade, completely free investment flows will not be possible. 
6  European Commiuion: Growth, Competitiveness, Employment; The Challenaes and Ways forward 
into the 21st Century; White Paper; Pln1l A and B; Bruacls/Luxcmburg.  I  CJCU;  p.  11 
7  The restrictions on joint ventures or otber forms of businell cooperation are especially harmful for 
SMEs, wbo more often tban  DOt aeed a local partner for teclmolo&Y.  production or distribution  in 
foreign markets. 
6 Even the  most  liberal  OECD  countries maintain  some restrictions  for  national  security 
reasons  or  in  traditionally  closed  or  monopolised  sectors,  such  as  transport,  energy, 
financial  services  or telecommunicati9ns.  The  reasoning  for  this,  as  long  as  it is  not  a 
co'ver for  protectionist policies,  can be sound.  For example,  a country should  have the 
possibility to control the ownership of  a strategically vital defence industry. 
There are, however, a number of  essential principles that should apply world-wide: 
•  A gener  .. commitment to grant the legal  right  for  foreigners  to invest  and  operate 
competitively in all sectors of  economy. 
•  Only transparent, narrowly defined and well justified exceptions from the general right 
of entry  for  FDI  are  permissible.  National  security  restrictions  or  public  order 
considerations might not develop into a pretext for protectionism.  · 
• · Most favoured nation treatment (non discrimination). Host governments should not be 
in a position to accord preferential treatment for investors from certain countries and 
thus discriminate against others. 
•  A standstill commitment not to introduce new restrictions.  Besides lowering the level 
of liberalisation  ~d  creating  uncertainty  among  investors,  the  introduction  of new 
restrictions would discriminate against potential new investors (for whom access to a 
market formerly open is closed) vis-i-vis -investors already present. 
•  A  "roll-back"  commitment  ,to  gradually  eliminate  measures  that  run  counter  to 
liberalisation and to open up closed sectors. 
b)  National treatment for establiahed inyestments : 
Once the right of  entry and establishment has been assured,. the foreign investor might find 
the operation of  his firm hampered by discriminating measures. Typical restrictions include 
a prohibition to own real estate, limited or no  access to  government aids  and  subsidies 
(the most important example is the participation in R&D programmes), discriminatory tax 
provisions or an exclusion from bidding for government contracts. 
While  most  of these  restrictions  discriminate  against  foreign  investors  and  should  be 
outlawed,  not  all  can  be  regarded  that  way.  In  the  important  case  of access  to  R&D 
subsidies, for example, governments have an interest to ensure that they are getting "value 
for money". Restrictivt conditions attached to the access to such funds can therefore be 
accepted,  but  the  nationality  of the  investor  should  not  be  the  decisive  criteria.  Also, 
narrowly defined public order and national security exceptions should be possible. 
I 
In general, however, the host country ~  treat the foreign investor and his investment 
operating in its territory in  the same way as  a domestic investor or firm.  The national 
treatment principle will have to be complemented by the most favoured nation standard in 
cases where boat countries Brant to foreign investors specific favourable conditions that 
are not available to national investors.  This avoids discrimination between investors.ftom 
different foreign countries. 
7 . J}!(1 iJ!EJIIJl~ll ·11111  ~  rtl(J~~  ~~  ~.~ 1'1 111 : . 
:a  .  I  J  I"  i s-•  U·  f  I.  1  l  0 
---•  a<"l  •  .,._.  -o· a  "  .  ·~  I>  ~~~"  £  Ill 
.  - •.  •  I  . t  I  I  i1  .  •t  "I f  5  I ,  .(  ~ 
J  ·  ~.  I r " I.  J  ~ •  f  i'  ;: ll: t  i ·  - · ·  ·  ~ ·  l  ·  I  ·  f. 
I  r•.  . JlS I ·•  .  i1J~t·  ·tf 
·  .a.  :( l" 
8  l t  •(  .. i  I  :. J . t  l  · 
j 'I  ~~-t I sl l.  1!1 .-J r  I  r  lsi I:. I  .  Js r . 
..  } f. s 8  c  I  I  ~ 1: I" l f II  ~  f  . f Sa f  '  t I f  i  l  ~  •. s I i 4.  How to develo.p multilateral rules on FDI 
The strategic interest of the Community in achieving  liberal  and  predictable multilateral 
rules on FDI implies that the Community takes the initiative and actively participates in all 
credible attempts at a multilateral level to elaborate and establish such rules. 
At the present stage useful work on FDI has been or is undertaken  in the framework  of 
the WTO and OECD. Each forum presents its particular (dis)advantages in relation to this 
work. 
a)  The role oftbe World Trade OrJanisation (WTQ) 
The  interest  of the  Community  and  its  Member  States  is  to  arrive  at  a  multilateral 
agreement with the broadest possible participation. This is why,  at this stage, the WTO 
seems  to  be  the  most  logical  and  adequate  forum  for  future  negotiations  on  such  an 
agreement. 
Chances of a positive outcome of talks in  the WTO within  a reasonable time-frame are 
better than ever, since the issue of  foreign investment has, in fact, been largely divested of 
its ideological overtones. A succeuful multilateral negotiation on the matter seems now a 
realistic proposition.  Indeed, it is more likely to .yield the desired ultimate result through 
the  WTO,  than  through  the  alternative  route  which  consists  in  a  regional  OECD 
agreement others have to sign up to over time. 
It should be recognised that wro in the context of  the GATS and TRIMs already covers 
issues  directly  and  indirectly  related  to FDI.  Given  the  very  strong  and  wide-ranging 
linkages  between trade  and  investment  the  subject  would  also  be compatible  with  the 
Organisation's mandate. The TRIMs agreement calls for a review of  its operation not later 
than  1 January 2000, with a view  of a broader discussion  on  provisions  on  investment 
policy. 
The fact that WTO will not immediately take up investment issues should not be seen as a 
major  impediment  to  this  approach.  The  Community  and  its  Member  States  should 
actively work for accelerating the timetable laid down in the TRIMs Agreement and push 
for  starting work in the framework  of the WTO  on  multilateral  investment  rules  at  an 
early stage, with a view to securing agreement at the first WTO Ministerial Conference in 
December 1996 that FDI should be on the agenda for, active negotiations.  The dramatic 
rise in FDI-tlows to the developing countries will support these efforts. 
b)  The OECD efforts 
OECD is currently studying the feasibility and possible content of  a multilateral investment 
rules.  The  June  1994  OECD  Council  of Ministers  decided  that  "OECD  will  (  ..... ) 
contribute to strengthening the multil~eral system by entering a new phase of  work aimed 
at elaborating a multilateral investment agreement with a report to ministers in  1995". As 
a. consequence, the OECD Secretariat and the OECD Committees working on investment 
issues intensified work in view of  a possible ministerial mandate for actual negotiations to 
start between OECD  members. in  1995.  The  analytical  work  undertaken  by  the OECD 
experts  provides  valuable  insights  in  the  issues  that  dominate  the  international  FDI 
discussion.  The  Commission  and  the Member  States actively take part  in the  ongoing 
work. A conaiderable IIWllber of OECD ·members ave shown inclination for neaotiations on a 
Multilateral  IDveltmeat  AgreEent (MIA) open  for acceuion by  third  countries  in  the 
OECD ftamework.  However, cme can question whether the OECD is ultimately the best 
forum for the neptiaticms on filture rules govemina world-wide FDI. 
The araument in favour of  an OECD appi'C*h ia that most FDI actmty occun within the 
aroup of  OECD countries and that it will be easier to elaborate 1D aareement of  very high 
standards,  in a  reuonable  tm. hme, amons  "Uk.minded"  COUiltries.  Non-OECD 
members  were  tblrefore  to  be  exclucled  from  the  neptiation.  but  coulcl  join  the 
instNment once it is  established.  However,  most of the OECD  countries  already  have 
· relatively liberal investment  rules.,  wfile non-OECD countries and in particular the New 
lndultrilliHd Couatriel have CODiidenbly leu liblnl ud  tnlllplnllt investment regimes. 
In addition, the latter lfOUP of  couatriea is attractina a wowiDa share of world outward 
investnlellt (~0  per cent of  world totaJ. in 1992, s~ per cent in 1993) and the most dynamtc 
are taen.e1vea ..-.ma u ~  important  IOUI'Cel of FDL llecently 1 srowing 
number of non-OECD economies bave unilaterally bepn to liberaliae their investment 
J111imea. Yet foreip i.aveston d  ltUIDble apinlt lipificant dif8cultiel in maay of  these 
COUDtriea.  AI buliMu operatcn in the Community iDcreuiDaiY recopile, it ia of  critical 
importallce for tb8 EU to ebiUre 1 pa  •uuent pr11ma throuP direct investment in the 
new fat srowiD& awkett of  Alii. Latin America. Eutml  Europe ad, in the. more diltant 
future,  iD  Atica. BrinaiDa the COUIIIriel  of IUch tilt lfOwiDa regions into a system of 
wiformly applied, multilateral rules on inwltment ia the only e6ctive way of IIIUring 
that  all  buaineu  enterprises,  irrelpective  of oriain,  are  able  to compete  on  an  equal 
footins. 
Limiting 1 neptiation on multilatenl inwat111ent rules to OECD members would exclude 
important acton, tueh u  Chi~  Kora. Bruillnd South Atica, and also the countries of 
ASEAN llld Central aDd EaUn  Europe. With reaped to the latter, the Community has a 
specific interest ia auociatiDa diem to-the procell iD the Jiaht of  the pre-acceaion strategy 
and our commitment• embodied in  tile Partamhip and Cooperation ...-nenta. 
To  pr•ent these countries with the result  of an ~  OECD  negotiltioll contains 
certain rilb. Not oaly would it "-politiellly diftbiJt for many COUDtriea to accept 111ch a 
procedure, they Jllipt well have IOUDd ecoaomic 8fOUilda fbr not doing 10 if  the OECD 
asr-nent.  aeptiated  without  their  participation,  did  not  adequately  reflect  their 
.c:oncema. CoDMqu;ently, 811 initiative fbr the elaboration of  foreip investment rules should 
iDvolve the  couatriea of Central  add :s.c.n Europe llll the  CIS llepublicl, the  New 
lndultria&led  Countriel  llld  ••flinl  countries  &om  the  ltlrt.  A  world-wide 
pheaoma1011 u  FBI lhould be ctilcu11ed  with brDid multilatenl participation, if  broad 
acceptance is to be. achieved. 
Recopiling OECD's expertise anct the important work on FDI alreldy undertaken by the 
Orpnilation, the. Cornnaanity and ita Member Statea should CODtinue their active 111pport 
of  the IDilytical work now undertaken in OBCD in view of  elaborating multilateral rules 
for  FDl  IDCf  tbu  contribucin&  to  tta. ~  of tile  multilateral  system. 
Consequently, the OBCD approac& ._  to proj,erty ndlect the pouible tat. participation 
of  non-OECD  member~  in IUCh a  1¥Jea •t.  FurtMrmore it ...  to be auured that the 
Nlel will prelllllt no obltadel to ~-exenUel on 1 broider popapbical scale, in 
partiadar  at  WlO.  The  ..,...,. of the  GATS  wt.re OECD  input  provided  the 
eornentone of  the ~  ia a pod example of  the politive role OECD can play on 
tbe way to iDtenlltkmll ru1ea with -broadest pollible participation.  . 
10 c)  BjlateraliiiJIOIDmltS 
The long-term multilateral objectives  of the Community  in WTO  and  OECD  could  be 
supported  by  addressing  problems  on  investment  bilaterally through  the  conclusion  of 
bilateral  EC-third  count1y investJnent  treaties,  in  order to  avoid  discrimination  against 
EW'Opean enterprilea (for example that which results from  some third countries placing 
increasingly UDACCeptable conditions on National Treatment) and to secure the promotion 
and protection of  investments of  Community enterprises abroad. 
d)  A focua on dcryolopQw countriela Contral and Eutem Eurg 
end .....  ecooomies 
Future diacullions and action concerning FDI will need to pay particular attention to the 
developing countriel, the countries-of  Central and Eastt:m Europe, the CIS countries and 
the New Industrialiled countries.  A. pointed  out above,  the  percentage of world-wide 
FDI destined to non-OECD countries is nearing the  SO  per cent mark. as opposed to an 
average of around 20 per cent in the  1980s.  More than one third of total  capital  flows 
from OECD to non-OECD countries now are FDI,  and FDI has in large parts replaced 
concessional aid  and  commercial bulk lending u  the most important source of capital. 
Thus,  it  baa  become  the  principal  financing  mechanism  for  the  modernisation  and 
expansion  of the  economies  in  the  emerging  markets  of A.ia,  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean, and Eutau Europe. 
This shows that FDI baa an enormous potential for the benefit of  international economic 
development.  Tbe  dramatic 'surge in FDI to the developing  countries  and  countries  in 
transition  hu heal helped  by  the ~  opening ·of these  countries,  but  investment 
opportunities in general are ltill bampered by bureaucracy and ad hoc state interference, 
balance of payments  restrictions,  imposition of TRIMs, low  protection for  intellectual 
property rights ad  opaque authorisation and screeniDg procedures. In this connection one 
should mention the catalytic role investment insurance schemes (such u  the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the investment  insurance agency  affiliated  with 
the World BIJik, but also national and private schemes) can play, in order to manage the 
investment  risks  auociated  with  currency  trlllsfers,  expropriation,  war  and  breach  of 
contact. 
It is obvious that the elimination of  these obstacles  and  stringent  uniform  international 
rules  on  open acceu for  investment  u  well  as effective  national  treatment  protection 
could  further  increue the  tlow  of FDI  to  the  developing  countries  and  Central  and 
Eastern  Europe.  A  major  step  in  that  direction  was  made  by  the  Community  in 
formulating  investment  principles  with  regard  to  the  ACP  states  in  the  Lome  IV 
Convention (He Annex U). 
In  the cue of Central  and  Eastern Europe the  benefits of FDI  are  of particular 
importmce. It is pnera1ly ~  that the ~cturins  of  these economies vitally 
dependa on the attnctivenea of  these countries for foreign investment. The transfer 
of  capital, technical and manaprial know-how is a key element  in making markets 
function.  Multilateral rules on investment· that are accepted by the Eastern partners 
11 of the  Community  will  greatly  increase the  confidence  of Western  investors  and 
contribute  to  the  implementation  of the  Community's  pre-accession  strategy  for 
Eastern Europe and the Partnership Agreements. 
DeveJopina countries 
Particular attention should be given also to the concerns  of developing  countries. 
These  countries  have  a special  interest  that  FDI  contributes  to  human  resource 
development and that MNE accept a social responsibility when  acting in the  host 
country.  They in particular want to  avoid that FDI inflows  are  motivated  by  low 
environmental or social standards, or that these standards are even lowered further 
to attract FDI.  The Community therefore should accept discussing complementary 
safeguards, such as codes of  conducts for good corporate citizenship for MNEs, to 
meet these concerns as an accompanying element to the general principles assuring 
the free flow and the protection of  investments. 
Liberalisation of  international direct investment flows can imply the liberalisation of 
other forms  of capital  movements.  It has  to be  noted  that  other forms  of capital 
flows to these countries,  in particular portfolio investment, have grown  in the past 
few  years even faster:  FDI to developing countries has quadrupeld between  1986 
and  1992, whereas portfolio investment grew 50 times  in the  same period  having 
already  reached  almost  the  same  level  as  FDI.  The  Community  has  unilaterally 
liberalised its capital movement regime with third countries.  Thus, in the medium-
term, rules on world-wide investment and investment protection should be extended 
to all sorts of  capital movements. In the future, IMF could also"become active in this 
area. 
The Community is aware that some of its partners,  mainly  in the developing world  and 
Eastern Europe, are interested in usuring that in a first  stage only capital movements in 
the form  of FDI will  be covered  by  an  international consensus to liberalise for  reasons 
related  to  money  laundering,  destabilising . currency  speculation  and  capital  flight. 
Although the Community's capital movement  regime is  almost  completely liberalised,  it 
could be envisaged that the international rules for FDI ensure that the FDI link of  capital 
movements· covered are obvious. 
s.  Orpniaina the Community approach 
The implementation of  the approach outlined in§§ 3 and 4 calls for further study on the 
effects  of international  direct  investment  and  other  forms  of capital  movement  in  a 
changing  world  economy.  In  this  context,  the  Commission  has  recently  published  a 
discussion paper on trade and investment.  8 
There  is  a  substantial  change  in  Community  law  with  regard  to  capital  movement 
operations  including  investments  from  the  regime  which  existed  up  to  1 January 1994 
which basically  only contained a "best endeavours" liberalisation requirement:  the third-
country regime of Member States on capital movements and with it the issue of market 
access for investments (pre-investment) has- with the beginning of  the second stage of  the 
8  European Commiuion. Dircctorale-OcncraJ for External Economic Relations. Trade and Investment 
Discuuion Paper, Bruuels/Luxclftbur&  199~. 
12 EMU- come under the Treaty (Article 73b to 73h). Existing restrictions on the movement 
of capital  between Member  States and  third  countries in  some  forms,  including  direct 
investment,  may  continue  to  be  applied  under  the  grandfather  clause  of Art.  73c  ( 1) 
subject to their elimination or modification under the powers given by Art.  73c (2) to the 
Community. 
In the operational field, the implementation of  this approach implies a strengthening of  the 
efforts of coordination between the Community and its Member States.  Given the shared 
competence that exists for a very broad range of  issues arising in the field of  FDI, neither 
the  Community  nor  the  Member  States  can  act  on  their  own  in  a  comprehensive 
negotiation  on  FDI  issues.  The  essential  objective  will  be  to  ensure  full  and  effective 
Community participation in the discussions ahead. Close coordination will be necessary to 
ensure that the Community and its Member States speak with one voice. 
The Community should also take up the dialogue with the European business community 
and  trade  unions  with  a  view  of identifying  their  preferences  and  concerns.  The 
Commission is preparing initiatives in this direction. 
6.  Conclusions 
The Commission requests the Council to take note of this Communication and suggests 
the Council to conclude along the following lines: 
•  to recognise the vital  interest for the Community and  its Member States to actively 
pursue  the  establishment  of transparent,  coherent  and  liberal  multilateral  rules  on 
Foreign  Direct  Investment  (FDI),  while  preserving  its  capacity  for  further  internal 
Community  integration.  This  will  ensure  the  presence  of Community  operators  in 
important  and  emerging  markets  and  will  provide  the  necessary  confidence  to  its 
investors to take the investment decisions which will consolidate Europe's competitive 
position  in  the  world  economy.  Multilateral  rules  on  investment  will  prevent 
discrimination  which  may  derive  fro.m  the  establishment  of regional  investment 
regimes and will discipline countries which still apply a number of  TRIMs.  Such rules 
will  also  enhance  the  attractiveness  of the  Community  as  a  host  for  FDI  for  its 
partners,  thus creating directly  and  indirectly employment  and boosting growth  and 
competitiveness; 
•  to  n  ..  -cognise  the  important  role  of Fl>l  l(n the  restructuring  nf the  ecunnmil's  in 
Central and Eastern Europe and for the economic progress in the developing world~ 
•  to  endorse  the  objective  that  these  international  rules  on  FDI  should  guarantee 
generally free entry and establishment for foreign investors, full national treatment for 
established investments and high standards of  investment protection; 
•  to  call  for  negotiations  on  international  rules  on  FDI  with  the  broadest  possible 
participation the result of  which should be incorporated into the WTO system; 
•  to request OECD, as a contribution to strengthening the multilateral system, to pursue 
its work aimed at elaborating a multilateral investment agreement;  · 
•  to  urge  an  early  start  of discussions  in  the  WTO  in  order  to  prepare  formal 
negotiations which should begin as soon as possible; 
13 •  to invite the Commission to analyse further  current problems related to inward  and 
outward investment and to come forward with proposals where necessary~ 
•  to  encourage the European business  community  to  contribute  to  the  discussion  on 
FDI~ 
•  to  agree to intensifY work within the Community on  defining common positions on 
FDI with a view to the implementation of  these conclusions; 
•  to ensure, with the Commiuion, that the positions of  the Community and its Member 
States on  FDI  be  closely  coordinated,  in  order  to produce the  necessary  unity  of 
action in OEC:O and WTO discuuions. 
14 ANNBX  I 
Stadlllcal BaeQroand on Ponlp  Direct Invatnl&lt 
1'he creation of a truly Jlobal system of mubts and production il  mlected by atatiatical 
evideace:  FDI  ltocb · wodd-wide  have  rlaen  from  USD 68  billion  iD  1960  to 
1650 biDioD I in 1993 (i.e.  11  per cent avenp IIID1I&1 p-owth). Aamdiq "to  UN md 
Burostat fiprea. FDI world-wide hu  J10WD fueer tban ODP and trade by a factor of four 
md three rupectively. Tbe llUIIlber of MultiDatioaal Pataprisea (MNBa) bu iDcreued 
from II'OUDd  7000 iD the lam 1960s  to JZOOO iD the early 1990s. ~  a result of these 
developments,  the  111ea  of foreip affiliate&  have  surpassed exports  u  the  principal 
vehicle  to deliver  aooda  and  lel'Yicel  abroad.  Firma'  Illes tbroup  foreip affiliates 
totalled USD 4800 billion iD 1991, USD 300 billion mote than the world-wide value of 
trade iD goods IDd aemges 2. Some estimates even put the value of goods md aervices 
sold by foreip affiliates even u almost twice u hip  u  that of world exports. 'Ibis alone 
Dllkes FDI one of the moat important mechanisms of international economic iDtearation. 
UNCI'AD estimates  that  u  much  u  oue  third  of world  output  is  under  common 
JoverDIIlCe of MNBs - even if  the estimation is too high. there can be Httle doubt that 
MNBs form the productive core of the J}obalised world economy. 
The  spectacular  raise  in  FDI  bas  probably  complemented  and  created  trade,  not 
subatituted it. CODB'VIti.ve OBCD estimates show that at 1eut 40 per cent of world trade 
is intra firm trade thus eatab);sbina a link between trade IDd investment accordiDJ to the 
formula  'exports follow  invesanents'. If  compared  to trade,  PDI flows  are still only a 
fraction of international trade flows  (around S per cent) .. 'Ibis comparison .js, however, 
misJeadina  insofar  as  an  investment  typically  involves  a  larger  and  .  long-term 
commitment.  Its  economic  and  integrative  effects  surpass  the  comparatively  Hmited 
effects of  trading tl'IDSICtions. 
The Commu!lity ~  by far the most attractive destination for foreign direct investors. Of 
the total fDI etosP of USD 1650 billion in.1992 about 30 per cent (USD 460 billion) is 
hosted by the CommUDity '. 'Ibe US boat USD 420 billion, sliJhtly more than the amount 
of all  non-OBCD  countries  igrepted (USD 370 billion).  Japan  remains notoriously 
behind  with  an  FDI  stock · of  below  USD 40 billion.  1be other  OECD  countries 
(USD 350 billion) host the rest 
1be CommUDity is a1ao  one  of the most important sources of FDI ·representing about 
30 per cent of wOrld-wide outward FDI (USD 470 billion). 1be US is the bigeat source 
country with an outward FDI of USD 490 billion, wbile Japan with USD 250 billion is ail 
important player. 1be non-OECD countries play a minor but increasiqly important role 
with USD 65 billion. 
1  Source: UN WorJd lavettmeat Report 19M udlJdiq iDtn-EU stock (estimated). 
2  Source: UNCI'  AD Wmld IDWitmeat Report 19M. 
3  ·  C~ty  of twelve Member Stata. I 
Fa.  daele:fic  alit  ern  au dlat till 0  "ity,  1ba US 1811 die a6llr OBCDcotmtriea 
..,.  a - ar ._  11  '  rwf  i1  ?!K Ia  111atifa to inlid •  aatward PDI-It8Cb. 
.....  J ....  iaa  iniJ oilast _..  CQ..,W  die .....aBeD---are llillllllillly 
"DiaCltoap.aflad•ei M•dCa  · sJ11 (OI.cD)r•  =re.,aztMefartbe  balk~)of 
~'lllftrrr  llae tMir .._  afi&w_.-iD...,. m flows bu  cleclined ""1h1y  iD 
1111 IMt few ,_..  ftam mea tllla a per cet  ia  1118 SO. ID 42- per Clllt ia 1993. 1be  .,._  ... _,....el  iau11• 1l' -.ea1i..t  .....cBD)  GOU8trila ladle DIGit DOtable 
...., ~ .._ FDI  •·•  r  •  1a  tm ~  ~- wem  drlaiDa 
USD 10 hill• ....  or clillct ia I.,  «;  ·or lllldy 55 ....  ·-total iDwlld FDI, 
Ollllpllld te D  '  _II  a\ I  -p  f4. 21 _pir m8l ia tM peliod  1910-90. More. tblll two 
.....  of dliiS,.. .... ,• 
1  1 
•  ~15  belt ccatiel.llllillly  iD Soadl But  Alia  •-Lada -AI'llaicL na  t...t  il  err  =••" tctCaadaue. 
-As .... -dille,  ...  - dp ...  , --··-,  of Saudi But Alia mel LatiD Amerk:a. 
llue Orrw'na-...  to m.t  IIIAK  pndc  .  •  rdy bit DGt adulively in  other 
cauat ia f#------· wilb tDIIl JIDicsatlcma of .......  USD 91iUioo ia  -~992. IDd 
USD 14 bii1D ta 1193. PCB af  tilt  •  ...  ia9Mtlla ill  Cbia am But«*' South But 
Alii& coaan.. ali  Claiaa· ba .- 'I • •  tb6 IIIia m;  hac of fcaip ...oECD 
_ilnaa•  ta, u _  W!lll•  ber a  ' I• itlllf.- •  illlcmnpy eipi'kat ~  of outward 
lavll ...  R)l fram ..  CGUI ..  -it.  dire:ctld  towlrd- tile  IDitBie iDdultria1 
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2 ANNEX  D 
Prcrrillcmlln i1X11t1Jc 11111ltllatlnl biitrwaena 
.  wJCb ......  kant  Jmpad on FDI 
1)  Wgdd TpM  OrJpniptjon CW'I'Ql lpatmmata 
Gegml AazMmnnt OP Tp<ln io SoryjgM COATS> 
The OATS covers investments in the form of "commercial presence" for the purpose of 
supplyiq a ·service. 1be benefits of tbe GATS are granted, i.L, to "service suppliers" of 
another Member. Investment as such is protected to the extent that the service supplier is 
more  tbm SO  per cent owned  or controlled  by a natural  or legal  person  of another 
Member. The OATS is the ODly qreement containing substantial obligatiODJ on FDI with 
potential world-wide  cowr~~e (over  100 sipatories up  to  now).  It covers all  service 
sectors and its obligations  ex1end  to  establishment  and  subsequent  operations  of the 
service suppliers of other Members. However, negotiations on important  servi~ sectors 
(financial services,  basic telecommunications, maritime -rt)  are  still continuing . 
.  Monopolies,  gcwenunent  pi'OCIJmJDellt  and  subsidies  are  also  covered,  but  specific 
disciplinea still need to be negotiated. 
1be central obligations of the OATS are to accord most favoured  nation treatment for 
matbt access (exceptions possible) and national treatment (subject to limitations set out 
in each member's schedule of  commitments). 
The GATS extends obligations to sub-national-measures, although exceptions regarding 
state  or  provincial  measures  can  be  inscribed  in  the  schedule.  The  GATS  requires 
members to make transparent the measures relating to trade in services. The Agreement 
provides for compensation in case a liberaliiation commitment is withdrawn. 
Que of the most important features of.the GATS is the access to the strona state-to-state 
dispute settlement procedures, including·retaliation, agreed upon in the Uruguay Round. 
AIJM'Qcnt on Tra"c.BNafed Jmmatmcmt Megures CI'RJMa) 
The TRIMs Ap-eement addresses a number of investment matzrs from a trade angle, i.e. 
TRIMs are subject to disciplines because their application distorts trade flows. 
The TRIMs Aareement outlaws such TRIMa which are violatiq Art. m and XI of the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  1994.  1be illustrative  list attached  to  the 
Apeement includes local content and purchase obligations as  well  as  trade balancing 
requirements.  Such illegal measures can on condition of proper notification be  phased 
out,  witbin .two  years for  developed  countries  and  within up  to seven  years for least 
developed countries. 
('-:2.. Apr.emopt on lDcJn-Bclf#d ADGU of  Inte»t&nW Property Rilhl1 CllUPsl 
1be TRIPs ~t  does not address directly FDI issues, but the improved protection 
of intellectual  property  rights  brought  about  by  tbis  Agreement  will improve  the 
inveatmeDt climate in the countries c:onc:emed. 
2)  Ospnjyrign for Bco!UliJ!is CooJmtion lAd Deyelomncnt <OECDl Insiruments 
In 1961, OBCD Members have adopted a Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements 
and a Code of Liberalilation of Curmnt Invisible TraDS&Ctions,  the so-called Codes  of 
Uberaliaation, and in 1976 a Naticmal Treatment IDatrument 
'Ibe Codes of Liberalisation cover inward direct investment by non-residents from other  · 
Member States, induding establishment in services. 1be National Treatment Instrument 
comes into play once the foreign  direct investment is made and  obliges Members,  on a 
non-binding basis, to accord foreip investors and investments national treatment The 
OBCD memben a1ao have adopted non-binding Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
which  establish  the  standards  of corporate  citireosb;p  for  Multinational  Enterprises 
abroad. 
The  sectoral  coverage  of  the  Codes  of Liberalisation,  while  comprehensive,  is  not 
complete. Countries can maintain individual lists of reservations, be it across the board or  · 
in specific sectors.  Important issues,  such  as  government procurement, key personnel, 
subsidies or monopolies are not covered. To certain commitments a standstill applies and 
there is a general obligation to reduce restrictions. 
The OBCD holds replar "coulitry examination&"  which amount to a close scrutiny by 
OBCD  Committees  of the  remaining  restrictions  on  FDI  maintained  by  the  country 
concerned. These examinations are to create "peer pressure"  aiming at the reduction or 
withdrawal  of restrictions  affecting  FDI.  Besides  peer pressure,  sanctions  for  alleged 
violation  of Codes of Liberalisation obligations can  only  be  obtained  by  referring  the 
issue to the OECD Ministers which could take up the issue in a Council decision in the 
form of a recommendation. 1bis is no real dispute settlement mechanism, and therefore it 
is often said that the OBCD instruments lack teeth. 
3)  North Amcrisan Free Trade Amnmnnt lNAFI'Al 
The  NAFr  A contains  extensive  chapters  relating  to  investment  As a  general  rule, 
investors  and  investments  from  otber  Parties  are  Jl'IDtcd  the  best  of most  favoured 
nations treatment and national treatment for their establishment and operation. NAFfA 
Parties  are  probibited  from  applying  performance  requirements  or  nationality 
requirements (or key personnel. 
It is important to note that these far-reaching basic principles are subject to liberalisation 
commitments and substantial reservations which  appear in the Parties' schedules.  Each 
country must also specify non-conforming sub-national measures within  a certain time 
2 after the entry into foree. Govemment procurement and subsidies are excluded from the 
paenl rule; monopolies and· state enterpriaes remain permissible. Financial services are 
dealt with in a separate chapter. Major exceptions pertain to national  security and  to 
Canada's cultural industries. 
1he NAFT  A investment chapter contai.Ds  a detailed  mechanism  for  tbe resolution  of 
disputes involviq the  breach  of the  NAFT  A  investment  rules  by  a host country.  It 
provides for inftltOI'-to-staae dispute settlement 
4)  Ape-Paciftc Bcopomis Coopntjon CAfF.Cl 
The APBC  ennuaJ meeting held  in  November  1994. agreed  on  a set of non-binding 
principles on investment These "best effort" commitments provide iL for transparency 
of laws and replations peJtaiDiq to investments; non-discrimination for establishment 
and  operation of investments from  any  other economy  as  well  as  national  treatment, 
minimisation of  perfoJmance  requirements distorting trade and  investment;  investment 
protection  with  regard  to  expropriation,  transfers  and  settlement  of disputes.  An 
interestina point is that the APEC principles forbid member economics to relax health, 
safety and environmental regulations as an incentive to encourage FDL 
The rather geucral APEC principles are only a first step and work within APEC on more 
binding investment rules continues. 
Signed at Lisbon on 17 December 1994 by almost all European countries as well as some 
non European industrialiaed countries, this most recent multilateral  treaty covering i.a. 
investment  is maiDly  aimed  at  Eistem Europe  and  the  CIS.  The  BCT  is a sectoral 
agreement covering  only  activities  in  the  energy  sector.  Its  main  goal  is to facilitate 
energy related lnvestments in Central and Eastem Europe and to help the restructuring of 
the sector there.  It contains comprehensive rules on investment protection and  notably 
state of the art provisions on trade-related investment measures, key personnel, transfer of 
funds, sub-national compliance and an exception clause from  the most favoured nations 
obligations for regional intelfl.1ion agreements. It has a refined mechanism for dispute 
settlement On pre-investment (market access, ript of establishment) only a best-effort 
commitment for national treatment/most favoured national treatment was agreed,  but a 
second phase of  negotiations addn:ssing this issue has already started. 
6)  Aep-BBC Cooyonrion of  l,qJ@ lLoJp6 00 
Lom6  IV contains a separate extensive chapter on investments with different sections 
dealing  with notably promotion, .protection, financing, capital flows  and  payments, as 
well as establishment. Lom6 IV thus notably contains a MFN provision for establishment 
(unilateral derogations possible) and framework rules for the individual Member States 
and ACP-countries bilateral investment protection treaties. In addition, the Community in 
1992 has elaborated a "Community position on investment protection principles in the 
ACP states." This detailed document sets out the salient principles which should govern 
the protection of foreign d~t  investment in ACP states. 
3 7)  Upi1M Hationa Oqmiytjqn  8K"'QQ'Gd Amcmmta 
World lnMlJco&Q!•l Property OrJerriydm CWJPQ) 
AI pointed out above for WTOII'RIPI  the  numerous  conventions ill the  area  of the 
protection of intellectual property coacluded  UDder the auspicea of WIPO do iilctirectly 
loiter the iDveatmellt climate ill  the countries member to tbele conventions. 
Iptr;medmel Labow O[ppjytjgp CILQ) 
1bc n.o niles on labour standalda and labour relations can a1ao be of. some importaDce 
for intemadoDa1 dimct investmeat flows. r-.j 
~ 
ANNEXm 
Prorilip11 rlf4tlnr to inultrMIIII in EIIIYifl AVtiiMIIII  qrulin P1111111rshi1 tuUl Cfl:OJIIrq#pl Am,..,nts 
ProPI6lou  EfiiYIIM ~'~'*  (.&t.J  Partllnr/lip ad  c.___  •  ..;.::.,• .AD  .....  ._IIt8 
with Russia  other 
1.  Establishment of  entelpriscs and  NT reciprocal but to be. introduced  MFN for companies only. For  EC offers MFN.  NIS offer best 
professionals  asymmetrically  financial services, national  of  MFNINT, with some 
treatment (NT). with  exceptions (Bel, Mol, Ukr,) some 
exce_p_tions.  of  which are transitional. 
2.  OperatioDs of  enterprises aud  NT reciprocal but to be introduced  EC offers NT  (Russia best of  EC offcrs NT for companies aod  , 
professionals  asymmetrically  MFN/NT) for subsidiaries  MFN for branches, with some 
.  with some exceptions. MFN  exceptions.  NIS offer best of 
for branches.  MFNINT. 
3.  Capital tnmsfen in respect of  to be libented including traDsfer of  Liberalisation of inward  Liberatisation of  capital 
investments  dividends BDd possible repatriation  investment in Russia,  movements for FDI including  .  of  capital  including transfer abroad of  repatriation of assets and profits  0 
,  investment and profit Russia 
may maintain during a 
transitional period restrictions 
on outward investment. 
4.  Protection of  inteUectual, iDdustrial  CBC to provide same level of  similar to EA  similar to BA 
md commercial propmy  protection + subscribe to 
international agreements 
- ----~ ----- --------N 
rJ 
Prorisions  Burtll!_~ AgreetMnts (BA)  PIITtllenllip 111111 co-opmllill• AueaaeiiiS 
with Russia  other 
S.  Competition rules, including state  similar to Rome Treaty rules  disciplines inspired from EEC  Ukr, Bel, Mold:  right to consult 
aids  rules, but less strict than EA  and obtain information; non-
rules  discrimination re. marketing and 
procurement rules within 4 years. 
Kaz, Kyr:  right to consult where 
trade affected. 
6.  Law in all areas having impact on  approximate  gradual approxilDation  gradual approximation 
umements 
7.  IDdustrial standards and ocrtification  co-operation_  (i.a. PHARE) ·  co-operation  co- on 
8.  IDvesbnCDtpnxnotion  co-operation (i.a. PHARE)  co-operation  co-opention 
- improve legal framework 
- conclude investment protection 
ureements 
9.  AcCieSs to JDJUtet  free tnde in industrial goods  MFN for goods and for a list  MFN for trade in goods (and Bel: 
of  services  for a list of services) 
Europe Agreements : Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, negotiations with Baltics started and are expected with Slovenia. 
Pll'tDenhip aod co-operation agreements signed with Russia, Ukraine and Moldova;  signature expected shortly with K87akhst;an, Kyrgyzstan and 
BelanJs  ·  .  CEC =Central European countries 
MFN= Most Favoured Nation treatment 
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